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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
"Tender of delivery is a condition to the buyer's duty to accept the
goods and, unless otherwise agreed, to his duty to pay for them. When
duly made, tender entitles the seller to acceptance and to payment
according to the contract."'15 "Where payment is due and demanded
on the delivery to the buyer of goods or documents of title, his right
as against the seller to retain or dispose of them is conditional upon his
making the payment due."' 0
The other leading case on self-service stores corroborates this con-
tention quite succinctly:
"It is true that customers were invited to take possession of the
goods that they intended to purchase and, if such possession may
be considered the equivalent of delivery of the bottle, such de-
livery was conditional and was made only for the purpose of
permitting the customer to take it to the cashier. Possession
alone was not in these circumstances sufficient to pass title.'7
The quesion of privity of warranty was not raised in the principal
case. There is authority to the effect that manufacturers and bottlers
of beverages may be held liable to consumers who purchased from in-
termediate dealers.' 8
HARRY E. FRYATT
Torts-Duty of Municipality to Erect Warning Signs at Curve in
Highway - Plaintiff passenger in a car driven by one Schreck was
proceeding eastward at 3:30 A.M. on a July morning over a street on
which residences were within five hundred feet of one another. It was
foggy and the car proceeded at between twenty and thirty-five miles
per hour. The eighteen foot wide macadam street with one and one
half foot gravel shoulders made a right angle turn to the North; a series
of twelve three foot white topped guard posts five feet apart marked
the outside of the curve. At the curve the travelled way, i.e. the
macadam and gravel shoulders, increased to a twenty-two foot width.
Schreck, when he perceived the white topped posts in front of him,
applied his brakes and after skidding fifty-one feet around the curve
collided with a tree at a point twenty-three inches east of the traveled
way. The tree was fourteen inches in diameter and over twenty feet
high. Plaintiff alleged liability under section 81.15 of the statutes for
an insufficiency and want of repair of a public highway due to an
absence of warning signs to indicate existence of the curve and the
proximity of the tree to the traveled way. There was no allegation of
insufficiency in construction or repair of the macadam surface. Held:
15Ibid, sec. 76(1).
16Ibid, sec. 76(2).
17 Supra, note 5.
18 17 A.L.R. 696.
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the mere existence of a right angle turn is not per se an insufficiency
and there was no duty to give any warning of road conditions which
in and of themselves provide ample and timely notice to one using the
highway with due care under the circumstances. Neither the proximity
of the tree nor increased road width at the turn constituted a proxi-
mate cause of the accident. Loehe v. Village of Fox Point, 253 Wis.
375, 34 N.W. (2d) 126 (1948).
In early English history the government maintained and constructed
the highways and nonliability of the sovereign attended this govern-
mental function at common law. In this country the majority of states
do not hold with this rule. Instead, liability for lack of a reasonably
safe construction, repair, and adjoining way is imposed even without
a statutory duty upon the municipality.i Wisconsin, following the Eng-
lish view, requires a statutory duty to give a right of recovery for any
insufficiency or want of repair of a highway.2 Section 81.15 of the
statutes3 creates such a duty. It was in existence as early as 18494 and
it is questionable whether the legislative intent at such an early date
was to extend the scope of the statute to reflectors and warning devices
for approaching curves. There is no other statutory. provision regard-
ing a municipality's duty to place warning signs at curves, but a lack
of a barrier or warning device for a new curve at a reconstructed T-sec-
tion has previously been held an insufficiency.5 Other cases consider-
ing whether or not a lack of warning devices creates an insufficiency
show that a freshly oiled highway is in itself sufficient notice thereof
to a traveler and no duty devolves upon a highway commissioner to
erect signs as to such conditions, 6 and similarly a barrier across a bridge
approach constitutes ample warning of road conditions when it can
be observed at a point three hundred feet away, notwithstanding icy
road conditions from which plaintiff may slide into the river.7 These
cases follow the general interpretation of section 81.15 that negatives
any insufficiency or want of repair of a street so long as it is, under
I McQuillan, The Law of Municipal Corporations, 2nd Ed., sec. 2900-2904.2 Hogan v. Beloit, 175 Wis. 199, 184 N.W. 687 (1921); McCoy v. Kenosha
County, 195 Wis. 273, 218 N.W. 348 (1928).3 Wis. Stats. (1947) sec. 81.15, "If any damage happens to any person or his
property by reason of the insufficiency or want of repairs of any highway
which any town, city or village is bound to keep in repair, the person ...
shall have a right to recover the same from such town, city or village..
If such damages happen by reason of the insufficiency or want of repair of
a highway which any county . . . is bound to . .. repair . . . the county
shall be liable. .. ."4 Wis. Stats. (1849) sec. 103 c. 16.5 Martinson v. Polk County, 227 Wis. 444, 279 N.W. 60 (1938).
6 Raymond v. Sauk County, 167 Wis. 125, 166 N.W. 29 (1918).
7 Butcher v. City of Racine, 189 Wis. 541, 208 N.W. 244 (1926), also see
Buckley v. County of Washington, 189 Wis. 176, 207 N.W. 558 (1926);
Lindgren v. La Crosse County, 231 Wis. 347, 285 N.W. 772 (1939).
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the circumstances of place, time, nature and amount of travel, reason-
ably safe for public use by persons in the exercise of ordinary care."
It now appears as a rule that no warning of road conditions are
required if, under the conditions of the road coupled with due care of
the driver, it can be said the road itself gives ample warning and notice
of its condition. The Loehe case crystallizes this rule for curves in
residential districts by upholding the governmental function of road
construction with the attending nonliability to the extent that a curve
in itself produces no insufficiency. There being no statutory require-
ment for warning devices the court indicated that the only basis for
alleging an insufficiency under sec. 81.15 may be an impairment of
view other than ordinary darkness or fog. Such an impairment appears
extremely unlikely at lawful speeds. California has arrived at a like
conclusion in interpretation of a similar statute.9 It remains undecided
whether an open highway attended with higher speeds and fewer curves
may present greater deception to the motorist under unusual conditions
such that a lack of a warning device may be an insufficiency. New York
holds it should be the duty of the municipality to foresee such conditions
and failure to do so is a lack of good engineering principles.10
It has been held that a telephone pole one foot from a highway
evidences negligence upon which a passenger can recover regardless
of the driver's negligence."1 That the distance of the pole from the
highway was of utmost importance was borne out in a later case in
which a guy wire was struck by deceased at a point approximately
eight feet from the highway and no recovery was allowed.' 2 In situa-
tions of this nature it is well to keep in mind that static conditions which
a driver should take into consideration as a matter of look out, are not
a proximate cause of an accident. Thus where a driver turned out to
avoid a truck parked on the highway in contravention of the statutes,
and being startled by a car passing him swerved into the truck, plain-
sByington v. Merrill, 112 Wis. 211, 88 N.W. 26 (1901).
9 Waldorf v. City of Alhambra, 3 Cal. (2d) 635, 45 P.(2d) 207 (1935) where
the Court said, "To the prudent operator of a motor vehicle, acting within
the scope of the law governing his own conduct in traversing a public 'street
in the nighttime, the pavement, curb, sidewalk, and the parkway with the
trees or poles therein constitute a barrier or warning sufficient to avert
disaster and as readily visible to the alert driver as a sign informing him of
the condition."
IoVande Walker v. State, 278 N.Y. 454, 17 N.E.(2d) 128 (1938); Le Boenf v.
State, 7 N.Y.S.(2d) 621 (1938).
11 Druska v. Western Wisconsin Telephone Co., 177 Wis. 621, 189 N.W. 152(1922).
12 Phelps v. Wisconsin Telephone Co., 224 Wis. 57, 271 N.W. 369 (1943) where
the Court said, "Druska v. Western Wisconsin Telephone Co. . . . is dis-
tinguishable. There the pole was within a few inches of the traveled path
and a very slight variance in course would cause a collision with it."
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tiff passenger had no recovery.13 Similarly, a party who collided with
guard posts when attempting to pass a bus negligently operated to the
left of the center line had no recovery, the moving bus being a condi-
tion rather than a cause. 14 The Loehe case follows the pattern of these
decisions and since the Court pointed out that the proximate cause was
the inability to negotiate the curve with a resultant fify-one foot skid
preceding the collision the proximity of the tree to the right of way was
not a proximate cause of the accident as a matter of law
APRTHuR H. SEDEL
13 Collar v. Meyer, 251 Wis. 292, 29 N.W. (2d) 31 (1947) the Court stated,
"The driver's sudden loss of control was due to a cause disassociated
from and in no way connected with the position of the standing truck.
The accident here was caused by the host's failure to exercise ordinary care
under the circumstances and not by the condition then exsting with relation
to the truck"
14 Swinkels v. Wisconsin Michigan Power Co., 221 Wis. 280, 267 N.W 1 (1936).
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